Approval Voting without Faithfulness

In this short paper, we analyze the implications of dropping the axiom of faithfulness in the axiomatization of approval voting, due to P. C. Fishburn. We show that a ballot aggregation function satisfies the remaining axioms (neutrality, consistency and cancellation) if and only if it is either a function that chooses the whole set of alternatives, or an approval voting, or a function that chooses the least approved alternatives.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar
Published in:	Czech Economic Review. - Institut ekonomických studií, ISSN 1802-4696. - Vol. 7.2013, 1, p. 015-020
Publisher:	Institut ekonomických studií
Subject:	Approval voting \| faithfulness \| inverse approval voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010827819