Optimal obscurity in the acquisition and disclosure of information about a shock
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki |
Publisher: |
Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) |
Subject: | Informationsverhalten | Asymmetrische Information | Investition | Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Theorie | endogenous information | disclosure | signal quality | transparency | specific investment | strategic ignorance |
Series: | ISER Discussion Paper ; 832 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 685593231 [GVK] hdl:10419/92704 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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