Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dequiedt, V. |
Institutions: | Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée de Grenoble, Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2) |
Subject: | MECHANISM DESIGN | PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS | RATIFIABILITY | VETO |
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