Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design

The note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratification. This notion is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power. We exhibit allocations that are note ratifiable and nevertheless can be implemented through a mechanism that gives veto power to the agents.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Dequiedt, V.
Institutions:	Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée de Grenoble, Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2)
Subject:	MECHANISM DESIGN \| PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS \| RATIFIABILITY \| VETO

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005606936