Repetition, Communication, and Coordination Failure
We examine repetition as an institution that affects coordination failure in a game with and without pre-play communication. We use probit regression with random effects to test hypotheses regarding the frequency and form of coordination failure in the presence of repeated play versus one-shot games. Our results indicate that repetition without pre-play communication results in a lower frequency of coordination failure relative to one-shot game outcomes. This result is reversed when pre-play communication is allowed. Our evidence also suggests that repeated play coordination failures tend to be suboptimal Nash equilibria, whereas one-shot game coordination failures are disequilibria regardless of the presence of pre-play communication.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Parkhurst, Gregory M. ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Bastian, Chris |
Published in: |
Experimental Economics. - Springer, ISSN 1386-4157. - Vol. 7.2004, 2, p. 141-152
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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