Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits : an axiomatic approach

by Werner Güth

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game. -- Auctions ; Fair Division ; Procedural fairness ; Envy-Freeness

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Güth, Werner
Publisher:	Jena : Univ. [u.a.]
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Verteilungsgerechtigkeit \| Distributive justice \| Neid \| Envy \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (8 S.)
Series:	Jena economic research papers. - Jena : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1864-7057, ZDB-ID 2388825-8. - Vol. 2010,014
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/32604 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944203