Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking : evidence from FAS 123R
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Hayes, Rachel M. ; Lemmon, Michael L. ; Qiu, Mingming |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 105.2012, 1, p. 174-190
|
Subject: | Compensation | Incentives | Risk taking | Corporate governance | FAS 123R | Aktienoption | Stock option | Corporate Governance | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Anreiz |
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