Veto constraint in mechanism design : inefficiency with correlated types
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Compte, Olivier ; Jehiel, Philippe |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 1.2009, 1, p. 182-206
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Veto | Theorie | Theory |
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