When is it Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-track Authority
Year of publication: |
2012-02
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Authors: | Celik, Levent ; Karabay, Bilgehan ; McLaren, John |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | ITI POL Number 17810 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations |
Source: |
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