Why do African banks lend so little?
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Andrianova, Svetlana ; Baltagi, Badi H. ; Demetriades, Panicos O. ; Fielding, David |
Published in: |
Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0305-9049, ZDB-ID 215159-5. - Vol. 77.2015, 3, p. 339-359
|
Subject: | Kreditmarkt | Credit market | Bankgeschäft | Banking services | Liquiditätsbeschränkung | Liquidity constraint | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Afrika | Africa |
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