//--> //--> //-->
Toggle navigation
Logout
Change account settings
EN
DE
ES
FR
A-Z
Beta
About EconBiz
News
Thesaurus (STW)
Research Skills
Help
EN
DE
ES
FR
My account
Logout
Change account settings
Login
Publications
Events
Your search terms
Search
Retain my current filters
~institution:"Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)"
~subject:"centralization"
~subject:"severance pay"
Search options
All Fields
Title
Exact title
Subject
Author
Institution
ISBN/ISSN
Published in...
Publisher
Open Access only
Advanced
Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites
Loans
Reservations
Fines
You are here:
Home
Search: "Moral hazard"
Narrow search
Delete all filters
| 3 applied filters
Year of publication
From:
To:
Subject
All
centralization
severance pay
moral hazard
42
unemployment insurance
8
adverse selection
4
absenteeism
3
contracts
3
firing costs
3
hidden action
3
incentives
3
authority
2
disability insurance
2
job displacement
2
matching
2
sickness insurance
2
work absence
2
ALMP
1
Co-payment
1
GSOEP
1
Hotelling
1
LEN-model
1
Latin America
1
Peter Principle
1
Ratchet effects
1
ability dispersion
1
activation
1
advantageous selection
1
agricultural policy
1
asymmetric information
1
bonus
1
bonuses
1
career choice
1
career concerns
1
cash benefits
1
child labour
1
compensation
1
competition
1
consumer directed services
1
contract law
1
contract-based incentives
1
more ...
less ...
Online availability
All
Free
5
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper
5
Language
All
English
3
Undetermined
2
Author
All
Parsons, Donald O.
3
Ferrer, Ana
1
Kräkel, Matthias
1
Riddell, W. Craig
1
Institution
All
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Bonn, Germany
1
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
1
Published in...
All
IZA Discussion Papers
5
Source
All
RePEc
5
Showing
1
-
5
of
5
Sort
Relevance
Date (newest first)
Date (oldest first)
1
Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2013
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632999
Saved in:
2
Understanding Severance Pay
Parsons, Donald O.
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2013
insurance and, if search
moral
hazard
is a problem, as scheduled UI. Like any firm-financed separation expenditure, severance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884124
Saved in:
3
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America: Overview and Assessment
Ferrer, Ana
;
Riddell, W. Craig
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2011
the
moral
hazard
problems associated with traditional insurance methods. However, it presents problems of its own. First …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008868138
Saved in:
4
Double-Sided
Moral
Hazard
in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts
Parsons, Donald O.
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2011
Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323545
Saved in:
5
Severance Pay Mandates: Firing Costs, Hiring Costs, and Firm Avoidance Behaviors
Parsons, Donald O.
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2011
The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding scheme would do – but that empirically the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225769
Saved in:
Results per page
10
25
50
100
250
A service of the
zbw
×
Loading...
//-->