hazard without an experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as agents act on private and generally ... on observables, and by having access to an instrument the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using ... both difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations. ...
Abbring, Jaap H., Chiappori, Pierre-Andr� and Pinquet, Jean �Moral Hazard and
Dynamic Insurance Data�, Journal of the ... No. 575 (2004).
Heckman, James J., Lalond, Robert J., and Smith, Je�rey A., �The Economics and
Econometrics of Active ... can choose di�ers across employers, and Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet
(2003) who estimate the dependence of claims ... Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ... Analysis of Health Care Markets ... The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 642 51 pages ...