We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game with noise - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed.Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy...

This paper provides a non-linear pricing rule for the valuation of assets on financial markets with intermediaries.The non-linearity arises from the fact that dealers charge a price for their intermediation between buyer and seller. The pricing rule we propose is an alternative for the wellknown...

We study boundedly rational players in an interactive situation. Each player follows a simple choice procedure in which he reacts optimally against a combination of actions of his opponents drawn at random from the distribution generated by a player's beliefs. By imposing a consistency...

Finite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies.This note provides some results on the existence of equilibria or approximate equilibria if some players have infinite sets of strategies.

In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has...