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van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future … of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts … to construct a behavioral version of the theory that incorporates aspects of procedural and bounded rationality. It is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092171

Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games

van Damme, Eric; Carlsson, H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090297

Refinements of Nash equilibrium

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090301

Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games

van Damme, Eric; Bennett, E. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090458

Informationally Robust Equlibria

Reijnierse, Hans; Borm, Peter; Voorneveld, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090474

Equilibrium selection in team games

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

It is shown that in team games, i.e. in games in which all players have the same payoff function, the risk-dominant equilibrium may differ from the Pareto dominant one.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090545