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Shavell, Steven - 1996

This paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carrying out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit to not carrying out the threat if payment is made. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473401

Corruption and optimal law enforcement

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - In: Journal of public economics 81 (2001) 1, pp. 1-24

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001584716

Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 1999

In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information between the parties to the contract. In particular, we showed how limitations on contractual liability might lead high valuation buyers to reveal their valuation of performance,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471688

Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle

Kaplow, Louis - 1999

The public at large, many policymakers, and some economists hold views of social welfare that attach some importance to factors other than individuals' utilities. This note shows that any such non-individualistic notion of social welfare conflicts with the Pareto principle

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471750

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 1999

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law -- the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors …, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory … examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471807

Economic Analysis of Law

Kaplow, Louis - 1999

This is a survey of the field of economic analysis of law, focusing on the work of economists. The survey covers the three central areas of civil law liability for accidents (tort law), property law, and contracts as well as the litigation process and public enforcement of law

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471847

Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights

Shavell, Steven - 1999

This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471851

A Model of the Socially Optimal Use of Liability and Regulation

Shavell, Steven - 1983

Liability and safety regulation are examined as means of controlling risks in a theoretical model of the occurrence of accidents. According to the model, regulation does not result in appropriate reduction of risk -- due to the regulator's lack of knowledge about risk -- nor does liability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477879

Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability

Shavell, Steven - 1983

Situations in which there is uncertainty over the cause of harm are studied (e.g., was the lung cancer due to normal exposure to medical x-radiation, to smoking, to exposure to carcinogens discharged by a chemical plant?); and the effects on incentives to reduce risk of various ways of treating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477880

Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety

Shavell, Steven - 1983

Liability in tort and the regulation of safety are considered as means of controlling accident risks using the instrumentalist, economic method of analysis.Four general determinants of the relative social desirability of liability and regulation are first identified--differences in knowledge...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477881