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Why Fairness? Facial Expressions, Evolutionary Psychology, and the Emergence of Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games

Eckel, Catherine; Wilson, Rick K. - 1999

"One of the successes in contemporary social science is the development and proliferation of game theory. For a wide … range of phenomena, game theory produces enormous insight into the strategic interaction of individuals. Its greatest power …, information aggregation or when confronting large-scale social dilemmas. However, as Ostrom (1998) reminds us, game theory also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468443

Compromise VS Capitulation in a Simple Model of Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information.

Obiols, C.P. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823910

Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining Over Many Issues.

Obiols, C.P. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823982

Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games

Farrell, Joseph; Gibbons, Robert - Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), … - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010677884

Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values

John H. Lindsey, II; Samuelson, William; Zeckhauser, Richard - In: Management Science 42 (1996) 2, pp. 220-231

The seller posted-price procedure is probably the most common method for making transactions in modern economies. We analyze the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common-value elements. In a model of two-sided private information, we characterize the fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009218220

Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts

Benson, Brett V.; Meirowitz, Adam; Ramsay, Kristopher W. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2014) 2, pp. 307-335

Do military alliances foster aggressive behavior in allies to the point of undermining the security goal of the alliance? Like others, we find that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard because allies do not fully internalize the costs of actions that can lead to war. But unlike others, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802137

Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining

Butler, Christopher K. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) 2, pp. 227-250

Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses … of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value … expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction. Critically important to this demonstration is an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802270

An Experimental Test of Rubinstein's Theory of Bargaining

Neelin, Janet; Sonnenschein, Hugo; Spiegel, Matthew - Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701414

On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise

van Damme, Eric; Güth, W.; Ritzberger, K. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game with noise - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed.Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090638

You May Have to Do it Again, Rocky! An Experimental Analysis of Bargaining with Risky Joint Profits

Güth, W.; Kroger, S.; Maug, E. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

rejected by the data.The data are better explained by either equity theory (equal splits) or by a game theoretic model where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090688