Showing 1 - 9 of 9
This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520754
In this study we analyze how markets work in the Information Society. In particular we concentrate on three important markets: the software market, the broadcasting market and "technology markets" where intellectual property rights can be traded. All these markets are characterized by modes of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520761
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187303
This paper analyzes a duopoly model with stochastic demand in which firms first choose their strategy variable and compete afterwards. Contrary to the existing literature, we show that firms do not always choose a quantity which is the variable that induces a smaller degree of competition. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121190
Entry for the Elgar Companion to Alfred Marshall, edited by Tiziano Raffaelli, Marco Dardi, and Giacomo Becatini, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121204
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649789
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649790
This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649793
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649818