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Other-Regarding Preferences and Redistributive Politics

Fehr, Ernst; Epper, Thomas; Senn, Julien - 2022

Increasing inequality and associated egalitarian sentiments have again put redistribution on the political agenda. Other-regarding preferences may also affect support for redistribution, but knowledge about their distribution in the broader population and how they are associated with political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306855

Social Preferences : Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences

Fehr, Ernst; Charness, Gary - 2023

We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347984

Campaigns, political mobility, and communication

Gersbach, Hans - 2009

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266018

Strategic complementarity, nominal rigidity and the non-neutrality of money

Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001355051

Contingent contracts in banking : insurance or risk magnification?

Gersbach, Hans - 2018 - This version: November 2018

We examine whether the economy can be insured against banking crises with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We study banking competition and show that the private sector insures the banking system through such contracts, and banking crises are avoided, provided that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932411

On the economics of crisis contracts

Aptus, Elias; Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2014

We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risktaking incentives and on the probability of … banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to … occurs and that leads to a form of collective liability for bank managers. We develop a game-theoretic model of a banking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337016

Does Market Interaction Erode Moral Values?

Özdemir, Yagiz - 2020

The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. An encompassing understanding of the virtues and vices of markets, including their possible impact on moral values, is necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823552

Enough liquidity with enough capital - and vice versa?

Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans; Zelzner, Sebastian - 2023

We study the interplay of capital and liquidity regulation in a general equilibrium setting by focusing on future funding risks. The model consists of a banking sector with long-term illiquid investment opportunities that need to be financed by short-term debt and by issuing equity. Reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014366762

Why bank money creation?

Gersbach, Hans; Zelzner, Sebastian - 2022 - This version: April 20, 2022

We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks' leverage ratios...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013187924

Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315203