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Tournaments: There Is More Than Meets the Eye

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel - 2004

By the well established tournament literature, incomplete information regarding the employees? productivity is … conditions under which the principal has an incentive to create a tournament that determines the promoted employee. We then … in the tournament. In particular, we specify the conditions that ensure that the most productive employee (the natural …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261791

Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

Fehr, Ernst; Henrich, Joseph - 2003

In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262063

The Endogenous Determination of Minimum Wage

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel - 1999

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of minimum wage employing a political-economic game-theoretic approach. A major objective of the paper is to clarify the crucial role of the strength of the workers? union and of political culture on the determination of the minimum wage. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262294

A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: The quarterly journal of economics 114 (1999) 3, pp. 817-868

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001410536

Does fairness prevent market clearing? : An experimental investigation

Fehr, Ernst - In: The quarterly journal of economics 108 (1993) 2, pp. 437-459

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001145308

Fairness perceptions and reservation wages : the behavioral effects of minimum wage laws

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Zehnder, Christian - In: The quarterly journal of economics 121 (2006) 4, pp. 1347-1381

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003406191

Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2004

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261781

The neuroeconomics of mind reading and empathy

Singer, Tania; Fehr, Ernst - 2005

The most fundamental solution concepts in Game Theory Nash equilibrium, backward induction, and iterated elimination of … to represent others' intentions, beliefs, and desires, referred to as Theory of Mind or mentalizing, and the capacity to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267443

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

Brown, Martin; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - 2003

We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261611

Loss aversion and labor supply

Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Fehr, Ernst - 2003

effort provision. This renders explicit tests of the neoclassical theory of labor supply difficult. Here we present evidence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261634