Showing 1 - 10 of 11
This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591418
first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602777
behaviour. -- Climate Policy ; Climate Coalition ; Game Theory ; Free Riding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008821874
This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200517
No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713459
In this paper a simple model is used to analyse the strategic behaviour of countries that bargain over CO2 emission reductions. Five main world regions are considered and their incentives to sign an international agreement on climate change control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213787
In this paper, the reaction of firms to the introduction of environmental charges in a given industry is analyzed. Firms may decide either to relocate their plants abroad or to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology. The latter can be either developed by investing in R&D or obtained by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213882
In this paper a n-player non-cooperative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213883
Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign a global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215567
This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116831