In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. Calibrating the model...

In a non-renewable resource market with imperfect competition, both the resource rent and current prices influence a large resource owner's optimal supply. New information regarding future market conditions that affect the resource rent will consequently impact current supply. Bleaker demand...

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with three distinct social groups, capitalists, private workers and public employees. After solving for the status quo equilibrium, which can mimic the advantages of employment in the public sector in most EU countries, the paper looks for...

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...

The literature on learning in unknown environments emphasises reinforcing on actions which produce positive results. But, in some cases, success requires shifting from a currently successful actions to others. We examine, experimentally and theoretically in a very simple framework, how...

The employment of capital is rival in nature. Small countries do not benefit from taxing its employment. By contrast, the use of digital services is non-rival and small countries do benefit from taxing expenditures on such services. In fact, some countries have already decided to tax digital...

We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as...