This study explores the macroeconomics effects of labor unions in a two-country model of directed technical change in which the market size of each country determines the incentives for innovation. We find that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease in...

How do intellectual property rights that determine the market power of firms influence the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare? To analyze this question, we develop a monetary R&D-based growth model with elastic labor supply. We find that monetary expansion reduces...

This study analyzes the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We find that an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth...

R&D investment has well-known liquidity problems, with potentially important consequences. In this paper, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in a Schumpeterian model with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on consumption, R&D investment, and...

This study analyzes the cross-country effects of monetary policy on innovation and international technology transfer. We consider a scale-invariant North-South quality-ladder model that features innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. To model money demand, we impose...

This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty...

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms’ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing...

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the...

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning...