L’approche MODA s’appuie sur des études antérieures portant sur la pauvreté multidimensionnelle et englobe un vaste ensemble d’outils, allant de l’incidence des privations unidimensionnelles via l’analyse des chevauchements multiples aux taux de privation multidimensionnelle et à...

Multiple Overlapping Deprivation Analysis (MODA) is a UNICEF methodology which provides a comprehensive approach to the multidimensional aspects of child poverty and deprivation. MODA builds on earlier multidimensional poverty studies and encompasses a large set of tools ranging from deprivation...

Identifying, locating and profiling the poor and deprived individuals in a society are the most basic imperatives for good social policy design. Understanding why people are, and remain, poor is the next analytical step. Multidimensional poverty and deprivation estimates are important new tools...

L’analyse du chevauchement des privations multiples (MODA) est une méthodologie mise au point par l’UNICEF qui propose une approche globale des aspects multidimensionnels de la pauvreté et des privations des enfants. L’approche MODA s’appuie sur des études antérieures sur la...

Multiple Overlapping Deprivation Analysis (MODA) is a methodology developed by UNICEF which provides a comprehensive approach to the multidimensional aspects of child poverty and deprivation. MODA builds on earlier multidimensional poverty studies and encompasses a large set of tools ranging...

This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty...

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms’ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing...

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the...

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning...