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How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
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An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay
Anderson, Ronald C.; Bizjak, John M. - In: Journal of banking & finance 27 (2003) 7, pp. 1323-1348
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769043
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Capital structure and executive compensation contract design : a theoretical and empirical analysis
Lin, Hsuan-chu; Chou, Ting-kai; Wang, Wen-gine - In: Journal of banking & finance 36 (2012) 1, pp. 209-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411141
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The incentive to give incentives : on the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation
Calcagno, Riccardo; Renneboog, Luc - In: Journal of banking & finance 31 (2007) 6, pp. 1795-1815
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003483500
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Does CDS trading affect risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation?
Chen, Jie; Leung, Woon Sau; Song, Wei; Avino, Davide - In: Journal of banking & finance 151 (2023), pp. 1-13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014463077
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Executive Compensation and Incentives : the Impact of Takeover Legislation
Bertrand, Marianne - 2010
We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763822
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Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives
Lee, Jongsub - 2017
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941985
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Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2008
managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774878
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Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment
Gorton, Gary B. - 2008
Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774972
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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2017
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861