substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament …This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …

profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases …

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …