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Endogenous strategic issue linkage in international negotiations
Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen - 2003
This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591418
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Economic and environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol
Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - 2004
first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602777
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The incentives to participate in, and the stability of, international climate coalitions : a game-theoretic analysis using the witch model
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; … - 2009
behaviour. -- Climate Policy ; Climate Coalition ; Game Theory ; Free Riding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008821874
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Regional and sub-global climate blocs : a game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes
Buchner, Barbara (contributor); Carraro, Carlo (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003356657
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Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions : an integrated assessment
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; … - 2011
2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition. -- Climate Policy ; Climate Coalition ; Game Theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009419726