We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions …, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes …

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced … distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight …. Noise traders bias prices upward because constraints make it harder for managers to underweight overvalued assets, which …

Recent accounting research finds that the discretionary accrual component of earnings communicates managers' private …--is associated with negative stock price effects when managers make income-increasing accruals. Opportunism that benefits … when managers make income-increasing accruals. The paper focuses on the incentives managers face in reporting earnings, and …

Stock based rewards are often used to motivate high-level managers to take actions to increase the stock price of the …' perceptions of influence over their firm's stock price. We examined its antecedents in a sample of 349 high-level U.S. managers …

-term underperformance, and (vii) reward their top managers of with large compensation increases subsequent to mergers …