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Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition
Zhang, Zhentang - 2002
assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436367
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001474245
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489460
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Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation
Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003
We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001771977
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Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure -strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624291
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The effect of market power on electricity storage utilization : the case of pumped hydro storage in Germany
Schill, Wolf-Peter; Kemfert, Claudia - 2009
. -- Electricity market modeling ; pumped hydro storage ; strategic storage ; oligopoly ; market power ; Germany ; ElStorM …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003898588
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Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460948
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Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst - 2001
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460980
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361017