In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each member veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on...

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Frage nach der Wahl eines optimalen Wechselkursregimes für ausgewählte Transformationsländer (Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Estland, Slowenien und Polen), die an einer baldigen Aufnahme in die EWWU interessiert sind. Der gewählte Analyseansatz greift...

Assuming the convergency criteria are not watered down, European Monetary Union will begin on 1.1.1999 with just a few core countries. With the help of the theory of clubs, Professor F. L. Sell analyses the incentive effects of the "monetary club" on founding members and "outsiders".

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is when, and under which conditions, a subset of the members should be allowed to form "inner clubs" and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it generates a freerider...

Wie wirken sich politisch-institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen auf die ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit einer Gesellschaft aus? Dieser Frage wird hier aus dem Blickwinkel der Theorie der politischen Ökonomie nachgegangen. Zunächst werden hierfür die theoretischen Grundlagen skizziert. Auf dieser...

Should a subset of member states of a federation be allowed to form a sub-union on some policy issue? When centralization is not politically feasible, allowing an enhanced cooperation agreement among a subset of countries permits the latter to gain benefits which would otherwise be lost....