This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with...

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with...

We examine regulation as a repeated game between a regulator and a utility facing a Markovian sequence of demands. Sunk capital would be expropriated by a regulator concerned only with the short-run interests of consumers. There exist rate of return regulatory policies supporting efficient...

A two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition and price stickiness is considered. This work shows the conditions under which price stability can implement the flexible-price allocation as a Nash equilibrium. This is possible if and only if both countries maintain a...

When John Nash won the Nobel prize in economics in 1994, many people were surprised to learn that he was alive and well. Since then, Sylvia Nasar's celebrated biography <i>A Beautiful Mind</i>, the basis of a new major motion picture, has revealed the man. <I>The Essential John Nash</I> reveals his work--in...</i>

When John Nash won the Nobel prize in economics in 1994, many people were surprised to learn that he was alive and well. Since then, Sylvia Nasar's celebrated biography <i>A Beautiful Mind</i>, the basis of a new major motion picture, has revealed the man. <I>The Essential John Nash</I> reveals his work--in...</i>

The paper investigates the sustainability of cooperative rules for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in a two-country world. The problem is set out as a supergame in which the threat strategy is to switch to a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. A number of possible non-cooperative equilibria...

We analyse welfare-maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic general equilibrium two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing...

This Paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The consequences of capital market liberalization to national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analysed. A...

We study the international monetary policy design problem within an optimizing two-country sticky price model, where each country faces a short run trade-off between output and inflation. The model is sufficiently tractable to solve analytically. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, the policy...