In a game with positive externalities, such as e.g. the standard environmental externality game used in the analysis of international environmental agreements, the solutions having the property of coalitional internal stability, when they exist, are compared in this paper with the solutions with...

International negotiations have failed to achieve an ambitious outcome to limit climate risks. A Cournot outcome where countries determine their mitigation commitments in the full knowledge of those by others could be an important step. It would avoid a Stackelberg (leader-follower) outcome...

We consider a continuous-time variant of the classical Economic Lot-Sizing (ELS) problem. In this model, the setup cost is a continuous function with lower bound $K_min 0$, the demand and holding costs are integrable functions of time and the replenishment decisions are not restricted to be...

This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash...

Effective supply chain management relies on information integration and implementation of best practice techniques across the chain. Supply chains are examples of complex multi-stage systems with temporal and causal interrelations, operating multi-input and multi-output production and services...

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.

The authors investigates refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the firsy refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and...

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...