We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

We report an experiment examining risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Group members come to the table …

report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games …

choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. We find … also show, by conducting an experiment to measure social norms, that it is consistent with social norm compliance. We …

encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we …