We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

reducing the degree of transparency. We run a laboratory experiment to test whether theoretical predictions hold in a game … played by human beings. In line with theory, the experiment does not allow the formulation of a clear preference in favor of …

? This paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation …

-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort …. This experiment sheds light on the extent to which symbolic rewards are used, how they affect employees’ further effort …

punishment, so that they increase overall welfare ? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to …