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Comparison of Mean-Variance Theory and Expected-Utility Theory through a Laboratory Experiment

Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

In the 40’s and early 50’ two decision theories were proposed and have since dominated the sceneof the fascinating field of decision-making. In 1944 – when von Neumann and Morgenstern showedthat if preferences are consistent with a set of axioms then it is possible to represent these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866845

When to Coalesce: Early versus Late CoalitionAnnouncement in an Experimental Democracy

Goodin, Robert E.; Güth, Werner; Sausgruber, Rupert - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

a coalition agreement, pre-election coalitions of onesort or another are actually quite common. In almost half of the …, such studies as there have been of pre-election coalitions haveconcentrated primarily on system-level explanations … announcement ofcoalitions.1While the dominant popular image may be one of parties meeting togetherafter the election to hammer out …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866941

(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by … previous history of play; in the static setting a player's concessions for all bargaining trials are determined at the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680

Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene; VERGNAUD, JEAN; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866694

Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange:The Impact of Loss Aversion

Dittrich, Dennis; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866697

Cooperative Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

We consider a modi¯ed pure public good game characterized by a pre-play negotiation stage, onwhich pairs of players can form binding cooperation commitments. As the introduced mecha-nism only supports pairwise rather than more inclusive commitments, it does not implement thee±cient outcome. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866705

“One Man, One Dollar”?Examining the equalization argument in support ofcampaign contribution limits

Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866710

Bribery and Public Procurement–An Experimental Study–

Büchner, Susanne; Freytag, Andreas; González Morales, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2006

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer)who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjectstreatment) to capture...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866715

Strategic Aspects of Hegemony

Goodin, Robert E.; Güth, Werner; Snidal, Duncan - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Hegemony is a central feature of contemporary international politicsbut it remains seriously under-theorized. We draw on cooperative game theoryto represent and analyze different aspects of hegemony. After developing ageneral conception of hegemony, we analyze the circumstances under which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866820