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Electoral cycles in savings bank lending

Stowasser, Till; Englmaier, Florian - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

We provide causal evidence that German savings banks where local politicians are by law involved in their management systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. The different timing of county elections across states and the existence of a control group of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958029

The Value of Information in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

Seel, Christian - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957988

The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market

Moser, Christoph; Lüchinger, Simon - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

We analyze stock market reactions to announcements of political appointments from the private sector and corporate appointments of former government officials. Using unique data on corporate affiliations and announcements of all Senate-confirmed U.S. Defense Department appointees of six...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164128

The impact of risk perception and risk attitudes on corrupt behavior: Evidence from a petty corruption experiment

Fahr, René; Djawadi, Behnud Mir - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2012

petty corruption where small amounts of bribes are involved and detection rate is rather low. To abstract from confounding … every period. Independent of the treatments we already find high rates of corruption in very early periods. Risk attitudes … measured with a subsequent lottery-choice experiment do not correlate with the behavior observed in the corruption experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010955201

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism

Wambach, Achim; Gretschko, Vitali - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958172

Continuous Time Contests with Private Information

Seel, Christian; Stracky, Philipp - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212440

Coordination with Independent Private Values: why Pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Kuzmics, Christoph - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212444

A Pareto Efficiency Rationale for the Welfare State

Napel, Stefan - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

Can fiscal policy raise utility for all in dynamic economies with unobservable agent heterogeneity, when missing credit and insurance markets affect incentives to invest in human capital? If so, should the state provide transfers to the poor in the form of cash or in kind? In an occupational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163910

Honesty and Relational Contracts

Schmutzler, Armin; Holger, Herz; André, Volk - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164021

Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination

Staudigl, Mathias; Weidenholzer, Simon - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We fi nd that a payo ff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958042