Showing 1 - 9 of 9
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539207
We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual's effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134718
We examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes. With three symmetric … players and two prizes, the tournament is completely fair if and only if the second prize is valued half of the first prize …, regardless of whether matches are organized as Tullock contests or as allpay auctions. For second prizes different from half of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011743460
In this paper, we study the potential implications of a novel yet natural voting system: strategic sequential voting. Each voter has one vote and can choose when to cast his vote. After each voting period, the current count of votes is publicized enabling subsequent voters to use this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514799
In a finite two player game consider the matrix of one player’s payoff difference between any two consecutive pure strategies. Define the half space induced by a column vector of this matrix as the set of vectors that form an obtuse angle with this column vector. We use Farkas’ lemma to show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512020
I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011632264
This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013269734
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172104
We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185940