combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament …This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …

the unverifiability problem of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first … all the bargaining power. However, if workers are rik averse or one worker has a lead a J-type tournament may dominate a U …-type tournament. …

competition. We find that leverage has strategic effects, but those effects are much weaker than predicted by theory. Specifically … predicted by theory. It appears that subjects recognize the strategic effects of their own debt. However, they do not (want to …

the outcomes of the two tournament types substantially differ. Especially, an employer will prefer J-type to U …

: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage …

In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts …