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Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains

Milliou, Chrysovalantou; Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vettas, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the endogenous determination of contracts in competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain first over the type of contract and then over the contract terms. Upstream firms always opt for non-linear contracts, which specify the input quantity and its total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123524

Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The fact that according to the celebrated Coase theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. We show that the hold-up problem,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661662

Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084329

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084400

Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest

Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871

The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets

Crawford, Gregory S; Yurukoglu, Ali - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We measure how the bundling of television channels affects welfare. We estimate an industry model of viewership, demand, pricing, bundling, and input market bargaining using data on ratings, purchases, prices, bundles, and input costs. We conduct simulations of à la carte policies that require...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001064

The Politics of Compromise

Bonatti, Alessandro; Rantakari, Heikki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

A team must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses a project and exerts costly effort affecting its random completion time. When one or more projects are complete, agents bargain over which one to implement. A consensus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083881

Cross-border mergers and domestic-firm wages: Integrating ‘spillover effects’ and ‘bargaining effects’

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Gugler, Klaus Peter; Sørgard, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Two literatures exist concerning cross-border merger activity’s impact on domestic wages: one focusing on spillover …) unionization rates and under high (low) degrees of relatedness. Employing US firm-level panel data on wages combined with industry … cross-border merger activity generate positive spillovers to wages, but are more likely to generate firm-level wage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083984

Wages and International Trade

Kramarz, Francis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

In this Paper, I present direct micro-econometric evidence of the relation between individual wages of French workers …’ wages not only comes from movements in the quasi-rent induced by competitive pressures but also from alterations of workers … my results, I find a bargaining power below 0.20. I also show that workers’ wages deteriorate through competitive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123663