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misalignment between managers and the firm, these two purposes are in conflict. This is because the worker with the largest private …: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion prospects. That finding still holds when the … firm owner optimally chooses the promotion rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138859
This paper derives a three stage Cournotoligopoly game for product innovation, expenditure on introducing the product and competition on the product market. Product innovation is assumed to increase consumer utility but is effective only if the innovating firm invests in marketing, so that...
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We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in...
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the need for a new theory of how cooperation emerges. …Wir untersuchen die Stabilität von Imitationsverhalten in einem experimentellen Cournot-Oligopol mit 1.200 Perioden, in … daher die Notwendigkeit einer neuen Theorie über die Entstehung von Kooperation nahe. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194591
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...
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In this paper we study the effects that loss contracts - prepayments that can be clawbacked later - have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. We compare the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285502