In this paper, we develop a new capital adequacy buffer model (CABM) which is sensitive to dynamic economic circumstances. The model, which measures additional bank capital required to compensate for fluctuating credit risk, is a novel combination of the Merton structural model which measures...

How do near-zero interest rates affect bank competition, risk taking and regulation? I study these questions in a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model, in which forward-looking banks compete imperfectly for deposit funding, and deposit insurance may induce excessive risk taking. The zero...

Under the new Capital Accord, banks choose between two different types of risk management systems, the standard or the internal rating based approach. The paper considers how a bank's preference for a risk management system is affected by the presence of supervision by bank regulators. The model...

This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relativemerit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation.When banks differ in credit...

Under Basel III rules, banks become subject to a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) from 2015 onwards, to promote short-term resilience. We investigate the effects of such liquidity regulation on bank liquid assets and liabilities. Results indicate co-integration of liquid assets and liabilities, to...

I study a model of market-liquidity provision by levered intermediaries that, besides operating trading desks, run deposit-taking franchises. Levered intermediaries’ heightened incentive to absorb risk helps to counteract liquidity-provision frictions that, in an unlevered economy, would lead...

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context when banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. When capital raising is costly, poorly...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks' macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk and by developing a modeling mechanism through which capital buffers can be allocated efficiently across systemic banks. First, a Distance-to-Default type...

Cyclicality in the losses of bank loans is important for bank risk management. Because loans have a different risk profile than bonds, evidence of cyclicality in bond losses need not apply to loans. Based on unique data we show that the default rate and loss given default of bank loans share a...