Existing hedonic methods cannot be easily adapted to estimate willingness to pay for product characteristics when willingness to pay depends on a very large basket of goods. We show how to marry these methods with revealed preference arguments to estimate bounds on willingness to pay using data...

How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals.

Responsiveness to payoffs and differences in culture have been considered as reasons why women have a greater aversion to lying than men. By using smaller stakes in a sender–receiver game than Dreber and Johannesson, but similar culture, no gender difference was found.

We describe an ambiguity hedging problem in Ellsberg experiments, where combinations of individually ambiguous bets eliminate aggregate ambiguity, and which may yield incorrect classifications of ambiguity averse subjects. We propose a new classification consistent with this hedging possibility.