Showing 1 - 10 of 150
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082165
predictions from the tournament theory to the context of transition economies in which state ownership still plays a significant …The promotion tournament as a potentially important incentive mechanism for top management in transition economies has … to decide on the tournament winner). Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324940
workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915741
predicted by theory and our simulations. Our findings highlight the pitfalls of relying on a particular parameterization of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012831983
We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990864
This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are compensated by positive continuation-value and selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013049077
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314
In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112772
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084675
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425