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Inside the Family Firm : The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance
Bennedsen, Morten - 2014
This paper uses a unique dataset from Denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance. We focus on the decision to appoint either a family or external chief executive officer (CEO). The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012752154
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Executive Compensation : A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005
Frydman, Carola - 2010
We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759098
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Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment?
Gibbons, Robert - 2010
Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time all the revenues are realized. We present evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760141
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Executive Compensation in America : Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2010
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763080
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The Growth of Executive Pay
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009
This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of U.S. executive pay during the period 1993-2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explained by changes in firm size, performance and industry classification. Had the relationship of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767553
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Globalization and Executive Compensation
Keller, Wolfgang - 2017
This paper finds that globalization is contributing to the rapid increase in executive compensation over the last few decades. Employing comprehensive data on top executives at major U.S. companies, we show that their compensation is increasing with exports and foreign direct investment, as well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956923
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Do CEOS Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do
Bertrand, Marianne - 2006
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783957
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012786483
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Pay Cuts for the Boss : Executive Compensation in the 1940s
Frydman, Carola - 2011
Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel dataset on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. We find that government regulation--including explicit salary restrictions and taxation--had, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121089
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The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency : Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover
Gorton, Gary B. - 2009
Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159958