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The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779401
The authors investigates refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the firsy refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779419
A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779432
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779435
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779462
In this note, we consider a negotiation model wherein a simultaneous voting game, which endogenizes the choice of the bargaining procedur, is introduced.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779482
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779485
The citizen-debate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779531
Several authors have observed that in interactive decision frameworks, welfare is not monotonic with information in the sense that more information can make agents worse off. This contrats with Blackwell's comparison of statistical experiments in which more informationcan only make the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779541
In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779547