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Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation

Gayle, George-Levi; Miller, Robert Allen - In: The review of economic studies 82 (2015) 3, pp. 1074-1118

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346120

Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A. - In: The review of economic studies 71 (2004) 2, pp. 397-424

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Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts

DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: The review of economic studies 84 (2017) 1, pp. 182-236

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Extracting information or resource? : the hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information

Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jérôme; Ricci, Francesco - 2017

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Contractual externalities and systemic risk

Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy - In: The review of economic studies 84 (2017) 4, pp. 1789-1817

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Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk : evidence from procurement

Lewis, Gregory; Bajari, Patrick L. - In: The review of economic studies 81 (2014) 3, pp. 1201-1228

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Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment

Karajvanov, Alexander K.; Martin, Fernando M. - 2011

This paper analyzes dynamic risk-sharing contracts between profit-maximizing insurers and risk-averse agents who face idiosyncratic income uncertainty and may self-insure through savings. We study Markov-perfect insurance contracts in which neither party can commit beyond the current period. We...