<Para ID="Par1">We present a sample of recent FCC matters of economic interest. These include nonstructural remedies in a number of wireless telecommunications transactions, econometric attempts to identify which schools are likely to have access to fiber broadband, and the implementation of “rural broadband...</para>

Why the objectors to Google in the settlement need not be on the side of competition. (Tim Brennan, UMBC)

Cost-of-service regulation that reduces prices will also reduce incentives to control cost. Increased output counteracts this trend when there are economies of scale. We derive closed-form approximations for the maximum cost increase that leaves a positive welfare gain when regulation reduces...

The continuing fire over how to assess the competitive effects of single-firm conduct received yet more gasoline in the wake of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s settlement of its antitrust case against Intel. Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)

The Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Antitrust Act were passed within 3 years of each other. Although regulation and antitrust both address market power, the ICA and Sherman Act had different objectives. After a minimal reference to just and reasonable prices, the ICA focused on preventing...

If email traffic over the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section “conversation†list is any indication, the recent 2-1 decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit Court in FTC v. Whole Foods is the hottest current topic,...

A focus on market power, with net neutrality as the solution, brings the wrong remedy to the wrong problem. Tim Brennan (Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore County)