Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...

We examine the relationship between South African Rand and gold price volatility using monthly data for the period 1980-2010. Our main findings is that prior to capital account liberalization the causality runs from South African Rand to gold price volatility but the causality runs the other way...

Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reduction we rely on the familiar linear public goods- game to set global reduction targets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed with a certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose a final...

We examine the relationship between the South African Rand and the gold price volatility using monthly data for the period 1979–2010. Our main finding is that prior to capital account liberalization the causality runs from the South African Rand to the gold price volatility but the causality...

This paper discusses the political economy of the climate change debate. The objective is to come to a better understanding of why at international levels (e. g. the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm) climate change was one of the main topics at the agenda, despite the fact that climate change cannot...

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...

We analyze the effect of “milestones” on reaching a long-term target, which if missed implies dramatic payoff risks. In our experiment, a cumulative threshold public goods game, milestones are captured by intermediate contribution targets on the way to the final target. Missing the final...

Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reduction we rely on the familiar linear public goods-game to set global reduction targets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed with a certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose a final...

Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reductionwe rely on the familiar linear public goods-game to set global reductiontargets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed witha certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose afinal reduction...

Based on German experiences, this paper discusses the political economy of climate protection. The objective is to come to a better understanding of why climate change has become one of the main topics at the domestic agenda in some countries, despite the fact that there are obvious free-riding...