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The classic theory of fiscal federalism suggests that different people should have different governments. Yet, separate local governments with homogeneous constituents often end up doing poorly. This paper explains why and answers three questions: when regions are heterogeneous, what determines...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010849630
This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters’ ability to monitor public officials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians provide public goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voter information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084457
This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rent-seeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in regions with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548100
This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rent seeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in regions with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632917
This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rent-seeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in regions with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643278
The classic theory of fiscal federalism suggests that different people should have different governments. Yet, separate local governments with homogeneous constituents often end up doing poorly. This paper explains why and answers three questions: when regions are heterogeneous, what determines...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011274513
Central-government politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians' allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012817080
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517338
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767323
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010206268