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Strive to be first and avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives ; conference paper

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the … levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340563

Strive to be first or avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2015

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different … tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337036

Entry in a vertically separated industry : price vs. quantity competition

Mukherjee, Arijit (contributor); Broll, Udo (contributor); … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002364486

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

Mukherjee, Arijit (contributor); Broll, Udo (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790632

Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking : the ranking substitution effect

Stefan, Matthias; Huber, Jürgen; Kirchler, Michael; … - 2020

Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220112