Showing 1 - 10 of 75
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131591
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150759
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928775
More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on … regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average … pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973067
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597088
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principle delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114332
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635883
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636018
We show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201217