Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human capital intensive industries? We present a model that may explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable...

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in humancapital intensive industries? We present a model that may explainthis. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ana-lyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimeswhen agents possess indispensable...

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human capital intensive industries? We present a model that may explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable...

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities, both the internal organization of the firm and the determination of firm...

We develop a labor demand model that encompasses pre-match hiring cost arising from tight labor markets. Through the lens of the model, we study the effect of labor market tightness on firms' labor demand by applying novel shift-share instruments to the universe of German firms. In line with...

This paper surveys major empirical regularities concerning changes in earnings inequality in Europe and the U.S. over the past 25 years. Next, it indicates which of these regularities can be explained within the competitive demand-supply framework of analysis and what is left unexplained....

In this paper we survey the recent developments in two empirical literatures at the crossroadsof labor and urban economics: Studies about localized human capital externalities (HCE) andabout the urban wage premium (UWP). After surveying the methods and main results of eachof these two...